Settlement in Afghanistan: back to 1997?

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Pyotr Goncharov) – Pakistan has started talks with the Taliban in the northwestern province of the country bordering on Afghanistan. Kabul authorities fear that Islamabad will stop military operations, thus giving the Taliban a chance to become more active in Afghanistan.

The two proposals on stabilizing Afghanistan, which Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf made during his visit to China in mid-April, do not look surprising in this light.


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He has called on China and Russia to increase their contribution to solving the Afghan problem, and also mentioned the possibility of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) becoming involved.

“If the SCO can come along, then we would need to ensure that there is no confrontation with NATO,” he said.

The SCO is a regional organization of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Other Pakistani politicians have been talking about the potential role of regional states, apparently referring to Russia and China, in Afghanistan.

Musharraf’s proposal has evoked considerable response.

Indian expert and diplomat M.K. Bhadrakumar interprets it as support for the initiative on reviving the 6+2 group on Afghanistan, advanced by Uzbek President Islam Karimov at the NATO summit in Bucharest in early April.

The group, made up of Afghanistan’s neighbors – Iran, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – as well as Russia and the United States as the guarantor countries, was set up in 1997 on Karimov’s initiative. Its goal was to negotiate a settlement to the Afghan conflict between the Northern Alliance, which represented Afghan authorities, and the Taliban, which by that time controlled the bulk of the country.

In 1996 and 1997, when the conflict was becoming uncontrollable, several international conferences were held and documents approved on the problem, but to no avail. Sensing the need for a negotiating mechanism, Karimov proposed setting up the 6+2 group.

In July 1999, the group met in Tashkent and adopted a declaration on the guidelines for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. A significant fact is that it was signed in the presence of delegates from the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, and the latter announced its intention to continue dialogue within the framework of the 6+2 group.

The world welcomed the warring sides’ agreement to talk as palpable progress. Unfortunately, this was as far as the group got.

Can this mechanism be used again, especially now that many express doubts about NATO’s involvement in the UN peacekeeping mission? Karimov has proposed adding NATO to the group as one of the guarantors.

Russian expert Vitaly Naumkin, president of the International Center for Strategic and Political Studies in Moscow, said all aspects of the Uzbek president’s initiative were good. They are acceptable to all sides, including regional countries, Russia and the West, he said. Importantly, the 6+3 format could also allay NATO and Washington’s suspicions regarding Russia’s intentions in Afghanistan.

Moscow has hinted more than once that it is not satisfied with limited aspects of its cooperation with NATO. In particular, it is not happy to provide only transportation corridors across its territory, and demands that it is accepted as an equal partner in cooperation with NATO.

However, NATO and the United States are wary of Moscow’s proposals to involve the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Afghanistan. Therefore, the 6+3 format looks like as a reasonable compromise instead of the SCO involvement.

The new format has a number of advantages. First, it stipulates the participation of Turkmenistan, with which Afghanistan has always had good relations.

Second, a contact group, such as 6+2 or 6+3, is not a formal organization such as the SCO or CSTO. (The CSTO is a regional security bloc in Central Asia that includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.) Kabul is not willing to join such organizations in order to solve its economic problems or stabilize the domestic situation.

Nevertheless, Brussels and Washington pretended not to hear Karimov’s proposal or Musharraf’s idea, but why?

According to Bhadrakumar, Washington fears that Moscow and Tashkent have coordinated their actions, and that the United States, if it accepts Karimov’s proposal, which amounts to NATO’s cooperation with Russia in Afghanistan, will have to abandon its plans for the bloc’s eastward expansion and the admission of Georgia and Ukraine, as a sign of gratitude.

There are other arguments as well. If NATO agrees to join the group, it and the UN Security Council, which had given the peacekeeping mandate to NATO, will have to decide on the status, mandate and powers of the new group. This is a very delicate issue, especially in the light of the group’s relations with NATO, which is overseeing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and with the United States, which controls the counterterrorist coalition.

Will the new contact group be effective as a mechanism of negotiations with the Taliban, and what will Kabul officials make of it?

There are other possibilities. One way or another, Washington and NATO will have to determine their attitude toward Russia and China’s possible involvement in Afghanistan. These two countries have as many interests and possibilities in the region as the United States and Europe.

The decision to set up the group or bury the idea should be made before the international conference on Afghanistan, to be held in Paris in June.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

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