By Joe Cochrane, DPA
Islamabad : In principle, it was a good idea. The US Congress last week placed restrictions on $300 million in military aid to Pakistan, demanding it be directly spent on counter-terrorism operations and that President Pervez Musharraf return the country to democratic rule.
The message was clear: Do more to specifically target Al Qaeda and Taliban militants who have regrouped in the ungoverned tribal areas along Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan, and while you’re at it, get the armed forces out of politics. Congress withheld $50 million of that aid until the Bush administration verifies that Musharraf’s government has returned to democracy.
You might forgive Musharraf, who was until recently also the army’s commander in chief, for not shaking in his boots. The $300 million, while appreciated, is nothing compared to the $5 billion the Bush administration has deposited directly into Pakistan’s treasury since late 2001 to reimburse its military for expenses incurred in helping the US fight the global war on terror.
Six years later, however, both US military and civilian officials are starting to wonder whether that was such a good idea. Pakistan has 100,000 soldiers in the tribal areas, but suicide attacks against the military have grown at an alarming rate and pro-Taliban and pro-Al Qaeda extremists have expanded their reach beyond the tribal areas to other parts of the country.
While no one is saying the $5 billion, paid in cash from the US Coalition Support Funds, was misused, officials and analysts concede that the Bush administration has little in the way to show whether it was spent on improving the counter-terrorism capabilities of Pakistan’s security forces.
“What happens to the Coalition Support Funds, I don’t know,” said a US military official in Islamabad who is familiar with the aid programme. “But it’s unfair to judge (the Pakistan government). We would like to have some more discipline in the process to focus (the aid) to specific needs.”
The Bush administration is already doing that with $200 million in economic assistance to Pakistan for fiscal 2008. The money, which in the past has gone toward numerous programmes ranging from building schools to good governance, will be specifically earmarked for the most urgent priorities.
In the tribal area, the priorities include health, education and infrastructure development, which officials hope will help nudge the region closer to mainstream Pakistani society and away from violent Islamic extremists.
Some believe the Bush administration should also be more specific on how its military aid to Pakistan is spent.
Musharraf’s government “has committed an overwhelming portion of security-related aid to non-counter-terrorism related programmes and weaponry, which have little to do with US national security,” Lawrence J Korb, a senior fellow at Centre for American Progress, told a Senate subcommittee hearing this month.
Instead of Pakistan spending the bulk of US assistance on counter-terrorism measures – such as training, hardware, and equipment – for regular and irregular Pakistani military forces, “the vast majority of our foreign military financing (FMF) has gone toward the purchase of major weapons systems such as F-16 fighters and other aircraft, anti-ship and antimissile capabilities”, said Korb.
In its defence, the Pakistan military has purchased tactical radios, TOW missiles, helicopters, night-vision goggles and other equipment specifically for operations along the Afghan border. The US has also provided counter-insurgency training, though there’s growing belief that to date it has not fully sunk in.
“The equipment, training and mindset of the Pakistan military is all for conventional warfare – with India,” said Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani army general and military analyst.
The US military official said Pakistan needs help in a variety of counter-insurgency areas including communications, intelligence, helicopter night flying and air assaults. While the US is willing to help in training, he said, ultimately “they’ll have to find their own way at building a counter-insurgency capability”.
Hence the need for Congress to keep the military assistance flowing, the Bush administration contends, as well as money for social and economic programmes in the tribal areas.
A US national intelligence estimate in July stated that Al Qaeda had re-established a safe haven along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border from which it could plan attacks on American soil, making Pakistan’s fight in the tribal areas one of the Bush administration’s highest national security priorities.
For Musharraf, a staunch ally of Bush, that fight is coming closer to him. Pakistan has suffered a record 54 suicide bombings in 2007, mostly in the past six months and aimed at military targets in the tribal areas and the garrison city of Rawalpindi.
“Al Qaeda right now seems to have turned its face toward Pakistan,” US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said last week.
Violence in the tribal areas has had a destabilizing affect on Afghanistan, as Taliban fighters have also found a safe haven to regroup and launch cross-border attacks on US-led NATO forces. As with Pakistan, 2007 has been the most violent year in Afghanistan since the Taliban regime was toppled in November 2001.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai will visit Islamabad Wednesday for talks with Musharraf, whom he has previously accused of being incapable of stopping cross-border Taliban attacks. Their itinerary has not been announced but it is a safe bet they would be jointly hoping that 2008 is a quiet year.