An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Syed Shahabuddin
By Dr. Hilal Ahmed
Introduction
The contemporary political discourse in India is shaped by certain conventional categories, which are not only employed to comprehend the nature and scope of different forms of politics but also used to assess the political correctness of social events and relevance of existing political ideas. For instance, the ‘communal’ is juxtaposed with the ‘secular’, the ‘modern’ is contrasted with the ‘traditional’, and the ‘grassroots’ is compared with the ‘urban’, by accepting these groupings as ‘natural’, and ‘intrinsic’. It is strongly asserted that one should adhere to these conventional categories so as to produce as well as sustain the ‘politically correct’ interpretation of Indian realities.
These categories also delineate the boundaries of ‘Muslim issues’ in India and define the contours of Muslim politics. We are told that ‘Muslim politics’ as a manifestation of ‘minority communalism’ could either be juxtaposed with ‘liberal/secular/progressive politics’ or completely ignored as a kind of ‘reaction’ to assertive Hindutva. There is an underlying assumption that an upper-class, upper-caste, male Muslim elite diverts common Muslims from secular/ national political issues. This assumption is accepted almost uncritically. As a result, the internal complexities of Muslim politics and the political ideas of Muslim leaders become less important and intellectual energies are devoted to reproduce the existing intellectual and political divide between ‘secularism’ and ‘communalism’.
This paper is about the political ideas of Syed Shahabuddin: one of the most prominent Muslim political leaders in postcolonial India. He is presented as a controversial figure and often described as an ‘anti-secular hard liner radical Muslim’ version of Praveen Togadia or Bal Thackray. However, if we closely examine his political ideas, a serious political thinker could be discovered. Shahabuddin is much concerned about the basic Nehruvian model of Indian democracy and the rights of marginalised groups. In fact, he attempts to conceptualise ‘Muslim issues’ in a wider context of Indian democracy.
The paper focuses on three aspects of Shahabuddin’s political writings: (a) the relationship between identities and institutions in the Indian context (b) the separation of religion from politics and an India-specific secularism and (c) the politics of ‘Muslim Indians’ as secular politics for social justice. Underlining the fact that Shahabuddin’s political ideas represent a very specific trajectory of postcolonial Indian Muslim modernity, the paper argues that if the given compartments of knowledge are abandoned and a more ‘open’ and flexible approach to postcolonial Indian Muslim politics is adopted, an imaginative Indo-Islamic liberal tradition can easily be identified.
I
Reading Shahabuddin: A Methodological Note
Broadly speaking, the political ideas in the post-1980 India are influenced by two interrelated political trajectories: (a) the recognition of liberal constitutional framework for radical politics and assertion of democratic rights and (b) the quest for an India-specific political theorisation. The political manifestations of these two trajectories can be found in various ‘new’ kinds of movements, such as people’s movement for environment protection, movement against displacements, Dalit and Adivasi movement and so on. Quite significantly, these movements have recognised the Indian Constitution and the given framework of rights for widening the scope of their agendas. Moreover, these movements also derive their intellectual resources from Indian realities and local traditions. The liberal values of Indian Constitutions are creatively interpreted in the realm of grassroots. The secularism debate is the second important and creative manifestation of these two trajectories. The rise of Hindutva rightwing politics and the demolition of the Babri Masjid raised the question of secularism and the rights of religious minorities in the Indian context. Again, the Constitution was taken as a point of reference and Indian situation is analyzed quite innovatively. The debates on secularism re-introduce the idea of separate ‘spheres’ of religion and politics, their intersections and their actual forms. The intermingling of these two trajectories in Indian political thinking introduces us to a kind of radical liberal constitutionalism, which has been trying to interpret the existence of institutions in a more radical fashion and at the same time searching the possibilities of re-assertion of democratic rights.
In the conventional mode of political thinking in India which has been dominated by the so-called ‘liberals’ and ‘Marxists’ interpretations, it looks paradoxical to talk about liberal constitutionalism with any kind of ‘radical’ impulse. In India, the ‘liberal ideas’ are either understood as the ultimate basis of ‘state’ system and highlighted as an anti-thesis to any kind of radical politics or on the other hand, are rejected for being ‘colonial’ or ‘capitalist’. The first kind of response to liberal constitutionalism in India does not allow any serious discussion on the very foundation on which the Indian Constitution is based. There is no possibility, according to these adherents of Constitution, to go beyond the ‘pious and sacred territorial integrity’ of the Indian state. The second kind of response comes from the orthodox left circles, which reject liberalism and point out towards its limited viability in Indian context. Shahabuddin’s writings seem to reject these presumptions and focus on more concrete political issues. In fact, he identifies the potentials of India specific ‘radical liberalism’ and contends for a democratic political space in India.
Syed Shahabuddin
It is difficult to understand the theoretical universe of a person like Shahabuddin because of two very obvious reasons. First, he never projected himself as a political thinker of any kind. He is a radical activist and his thoughts stem from his practical engagement with politics. Secondly, Shahabuddin’s political thoughts cannot be understood in the given ‘liberal versus Marxist’ or ‘communal versus secular’ frameworks. Shahabuddin certainly goes beyond these categorisations and introduces us to much wider political conceptualisation, which is very much rooted in the Indian political tradition of Nehru, J.P. and Ambedkar.
The ‘contextualisation’ of Shahabuddin in his political universe could be a possible approach to map out the common strand of his ideas. This is a more straightforward ‘option’. Alternatively, we could attempt to trace any one ‘basic unit’ of analysis/logical coherence in his discursive ideas to find out a ‘systematic’ theorisation of any kind. In both the cases, there are some inbuilt contradictions. For instance, Shahabuddin’s intellectual context is highly dominated by his political activities in the Babri Masjid case. There is a possibility that this complicated aspect could overshadow his other intellectual concerns. Secondly, if we search any ‘one/specific’ unit of analysis, we might not be able to give adequate importance to his wider thinking process. In such a situation we have to select certain ‘representative’ aspects of his thinking and for that a conscious examination of his political statements is required.
For the purpose of our analysis, Shahabuddin’s political writings can be divided into two phases: (a) his writings of 1986-1989 period, when the Babri Masjid movement was his prime political occupation and (b) his recent writings (2003-04), when he gets involved in a debate on the question of ‘Dalit Muslims’ and the OBC reservation. While dealing with these two ‘contexts’ we attempt to see how Shahabuddin tries to conceptualise his political ideas for understanding the emerging political trends of Indian democracy such as the multiple manifestations of identities and the significance of legal-constitutional framework for democratic movements. Writing on these abstract formulations, Shahabuddin makes a significant attempt to articulate the possibility of democratic struggles for social justice and a notion of secularism in Indian context.
The writing style of Shahabuddin is very conscious and well-structured. He always employs a kind of inductive ‘reasoning’ in which simple examples, basic facts and data are systematically analysed in order to explain general rules and principles related to the wider socio-political processes. This style of writing helps Shahabuddin to communicate with a variety of readers without losing the internal consistency of his arguments. Shahabuddin’s political statements not only contain facts, analysis and comments but there are a number of abstract ideas, which most of the time, has not been taken seriously as ‘the ingredients’ of any kind of political theorisation. Thus, his editorials published in Muslim India and his statements and commentaries on different issues could easily be connected to investigate the flow of his political ideas.
II
Identities, institutions and power: the question of ‘politics of social justice’
Let us begin with Shahabuddin’s understanding of identity. He writes ‘a man is born in a religion, in a language, in a region and in a caste groups, he has no choice; he grows up as a member of a social groups; it is not his fault’….. Identity is not un-dimensional because human personality is multi-dimensional. These dimensions do not supersede or override one another nor are they higher or lower in an absolute sense. Religion is not comparable to language; nationality is not comparable to religion; culture is not comparable to race’ (Shahabuddin, 1986, p.532). This statement recognises the existence of multiple human identities. In this conceptualisation, Shahabuddin does subscribe to the view that any form of cultural identity could not be understood merely as a reflection of a ‘singular’, ‘given’, ‘unadulterated’, or ‘natural’ form of social relations. In his opinion, identities are constituted historically and socio-cultural and political processes do play an important role in shaping the discursive universe of social associations.
Recognising the fact that these multiple identities do not necessarily co-exist and many a time create social tensions, he further remarks that ‘every identity generates its own demands, creates its own rights and duties, interests and responsibilities but all such demands are not operative at the same time and the human response depend on the nature of the situation, on a particular conjunction of man time and space. …. Why one dimension should be confused with or measured against another. … Each dimension of the personality, no doubt enrich life but creates its own universe. These universes co-exist within Man. Yes, there can be situations when there is a conflict at the interface of two dimension; the intersection of two universe’ (Ibid).
To avoid such critical situations when one dimension of identity challenges the other and ‘cultural negotiations’ reach to an impasse, Shahabuddin suggests two interrelated possible solutions. Firstly, he claims that we should accept diversity as the precondition of social order. Refuting the assimilation thesis proposed by the Hindu rightists, he argues that if a social system does not acknowledge diversity of identities, it cannot produce desired social cohesion. He writes…. ‘Assimilation shall never be the answer; it is neither feasible nor desirable; it is meaningless to challenge the divine order; Diversity is the condition of Man; civilisation is the acceptance of diversity; in diversity lies freedom’ (Shahabuddin, 1986, p. 533).
The formation of representative and democratic institutions is the second way out to reconcile conflicting interests. In fact, based upon the principle of diversity and social participation, a mechanism of law and democratic rights could be established, which in his opinion, can ensure the protection of multi-dimensionality of human personality. In other words, Shahabuddin argues that if we accept diversity as a principle of social cohesion, we could develop a modus-operandi for practical requirements of peaceful co-existence.
Focusing upon the specificity of the Indian context, Shahabuddin emphasises the fact that the religion and caste determine the basic logic of Indian identities. He writes, ‘within the territorial framework of the Indian state to whose defence and glory all citizens are committed, our primary identity is still defined by religion; our secondary identity by caste; our tertiary identity by our social function. Who can ignore the religious and caste pressure in the socio-political field?’ (Shahabuddin, 1987, pp. 435-436). The basic framework of the Indian state, Shahabuddin says, was established to accommodate these identities and to ensure plurality of Indian social life. He notes ‘Indian state was designed for a plural society with multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic, multi-dimensional personality. The state provided a framework of laws, and institutions, which would resolve the conflict of interests when they arise, determine the point of balance between state and citizen & between citizen and citizen & between state and social groups & between social group and social group’ (Shahabuddin, 1986, p. 532).
In his opinion, the state in India adopted an India specific secularism that respects all religions but maintains equidistance from all religious groups. It has created a federal stricture and re-organised states on linguistic bases, identified rights of distinct ethnic and social groups and religious freedom to religious minorities, and applied the concept of protective discrimination to provide reservation to backwards classes. In Shahabuddin’s view these examples show that the Indian Constitution established a system for the specific needs of Indian social life.
This is a very important line of argument. It modifies the conventional liberal position that gives importance to the interest orientation of individuals and suggests that the formation of the institution/state could be a practical resolve for reconciling the conflict interests/opinions for wider social progress. On the contrary, this assertion goes beyond the ‘individual’ based liberal constitutionalism. It focuses upon the group affiliations and quite wittingly identifies the basics of Indian social system. Shahabuddin quite forcefully contends that the Indian legal constitutional framework is capable of producing and sustaining social equilibrium of Indian civil society.
Syed Shahabuddin recalls Babri Masjid movement
Now the question arises: if the system is well-equipped for dealing with any kind of social disruptions, what is the significance of mass politics? Let us first look at the contentious issues raised by Shahabuddin in this regard. In one of his editorials, he points out that the problem of the Indian state management is to reconcile the pressures generated by different social groups. He warns the state that by ignoring these pressures, ‘we only store explosive in the basement; suppressing them we invite instant explosion…. But by developing a system of check and balance within an order of justice and fairness, we create a model of peaceful coexistence as well as a pattern of harmonious transmission’ (Shahabuddin, 1986, p.532). In another article he further tries to locate the problem. He argues that the distribution of social goods and the fruits of development could not ‘trickle down’ properly to all the social groups. Therefore, the pace of development/mobility of different social groups in India varies: qualitatively as well as quantitatively. As a result, the power gets concentrated in a few hands and a dominant group emerged. This dominant group not only controls the state institutions that were made for equal social distribution but also use violence to maintain a status-qua in favour of existing inequalities. Shahabuddin notes ‘…in India we are reaching the intersection, the point of explosion. The tribal unrest, the militancy among the dalits, the upsurge among the OBCs, and the dissatisfaction among the minorities are no more than signals. … They (dominant group) promise all that every thing except land to tiller, living wages to workers, proportional reservation of public employment, universal and compulsory education’ (Shahabuddin, 1989, p. 100).
Thus, for Shahabuddin, the centralisation of power is the most important problem of Indian system. Because of this centralisation, the established institutions are not performing the required functions. It is significant here to point out that Shahabuddin identifies two aspects of this centralisation. First, there is a lack of adequate representation of different groups in the institutions and therefore the power gets centralised. Secondly, the dominant group is not only using the state apparatus for its own vested interests but also trying to demolish the fundamental structure of Indian state: the Nehru-Gandhi model, thus there is a perpetuation of the process of centralisation. He writes ‘today the very foundation of the Indian state is being challenged … Chauvinists pressures have shattered the Gandhi-Nehru frame of reference. And no substitute is yet available nor shall a viable alternative ever be possible for the Indian state represents the wisdom of the ages, distillation of human experience, and reflect human existence in all its diversity’ (Shahabuddin, 1986, pp. 532-533). In the backdrop of this important equation of power, he argues for the importance of mass struggle.
Shahabuddin sees ‘politics’ as a kind of mechanism for ensuring ‘democratic’ functioning of the institutions. He does not follow a strict and closed reading of Indian Constitution. On the contrary, he makes an attempt to understand the relationship between the constitutional provisions and changing socio-political realties. He focuses on the idea of ‘social justice’, and suggests that ‘politics is the management of human society. Management means dealing with problems and situations as they arise and with demands of consumption with available resources and technologies’ (Shahabuddin, 1987, pp. 435-436). Recognising the centrality of politics in a democratic system, Shahabuddin appreciates politics as a means to assert democratic rights for getting equal share in the process of distribution. In his opinion, ‘politics is not only a sword to secure your share but a shield to protect your identity. And there can be no dignity without identity’ (Shahabuddin, 1987a, p. 387).
The idea of ‘social justice’ is the central focus of his political thinking. He points out that the present condition is characterised by inter-group disparities and inequalities. To avoid these barriers, he suggests that we need to imagine a kind of Utopia where ‘all groups have equal access to the wealth of the society’ (Shahabuddin, Ibid, p.387). If, Shahabuddin further writes, ‘the state does not pick and choose and its functionaries enjoy no discretion for expanding patronage to some and for depriving others, conflict situations are automatically avoided. To the extent, the distribution cannot be universal; the selection system should be as objective, anonymous and balance as possible. Justice should not only be done but seen to be done’ (Shahabuddin, 1987, pp. 435-436). The politics of participation and collective governance therefore are the instrument by which the ‘ideals of social justice’ could be achieved. He argues that all the social groups, including Indian Muslims, should struggle collectively for establishing a democratic and secular polity. He notes ‘participation in the common struggle will ensure that when the struggle ushers in the new dawn, he [Muslims] shall get what is due to him in justice and equality’ (Shahabuddin, 2003, p. 13).
The following figure illustrates the understanding of Syed Shahabuddin on identities, institutions and the necessity of mass politics. In this structure, the principle of multiple identities and plurality, which reflects the collective wisdom of the diversified Indian population, is the foundation of Indian political system. The Indian Constitution is a legal expression of this principle and thus the constitutionally established institutions are supposed to protect and sustain the ‘collective Indian social plurality’. Since this sort of ‘collective plurality’ does require a ‘social equity’ of some kind for its clear and concrete manifestation, the institutions are designed to ensure the principle of equality in such manner that the deprived and marginalised social groups could have an equal access to political power. In other words, the qualitative equality should sustain collective plurality. The politics of participation has two roles to play. (a) Participation as the ‘first push’ so that the system could work effectively without any failure. The free, fair and regular elections at every level of political system could be an example of this kind of democratic participation. (b) Participation to ensure that the broad objectives of collective plurality should be achieved. This is the kind of mass participation which Shahabuddin calls ‘mass politics of social justice’.
This discussion leads us to another very basic question: Is this framework ‘communal’ or separatist? After all, Shahabuddin is a Muslim leader and he has been accused several times for being separatist and hard liner. In other words, one has to locate the exact placing of religion and secularism in his conceptualisation.
III
‘Comparing’ Religion and Politics in India: the Question of Indian secularism
Let me begin with two very basic issues: why religion and politics should be compared with each other and what is the interrelationship between these two social activities in contemporary India. Shahabuddin firmly believes that the religion and politics cannot be compared. For him ‘religion stands for eternal and universal values. .. provides ethical foundation of human existence…. gives a Man a permanent value system. ….. a permanent set of principles to determine our conduct and behaviour in changing situations and circumstances’ (Shahabuddin, 1987, pp. 435-436). Politics for him, as we have seen, is some thing which is related to the social distribution. Thus, for Shahabuddin ‘there is no logical basis for comparing or contrasting religion and politics. People and societies go on changing; religion remains changeless. Religion is constant, politics is variable. In this sense, ‘politics without the anchor sheet of religious values can only be tyrannical and oppressive’ (Ibid). However, Shahabuddin is fully aware about the expanding powers modern state. He notes ‘historically it is not religion which is encroaching upon the state today, it is the state which is pressing upon religion, extending its area of operation and taking over the middle space, inch by inch. As religion contracts, the state expands’ (Ibid).
Thus, in the very first instance, Shahabuddin turns the table in favour of religion. He criticises the separation of religion from the public life and denounces such attempts as a kind of ‘neo-secularism’. In his opinion if religion is strictly separated from the public life, it would harm the interests of minorities because the religious values of majority would continue be manifested in the name of ‘national culture’. He notes ‘the grand idea of neo-secularist is to ban public manifestation of all religions, but the value and ethos of the rites and rituals of the majority religion shall continue to reign supreme in the name of national culture’ (Ibid). So what is the way out?
Shahabuddin, reiterating the importance of religion in public life, suggests that the powers of religion can also be used for the wider social objectives. In his opinion, the true message of religion could create a just society. He says ‘what needs to be done is to harness as Gandhi did the immense power of religion and its message of unity of mankind for human good for social purposes. Conflict can be eliminated through acceptance of diversity and through social justice’ (Ibid).
Here it is important to point out that Shahabuddin does not subscribe to an ‘anti-secular’ position. He tries to conceptualise the role of a secular state in a multi-religious society. In his opinion a secular state in a society like India has to fulfil at least three basic requirements. Firstly, Shahabuddin focuses on the neutrality of the state. He says ‘a secular state in a multi-religious society must not only guarantee freedom of religion and of conscience but act as an umpire in the case of conflict between one religious group and another and lay down norms for the reconciliation of conflicting claims’ (Ibid). This argument simply follows the conventional position on secularism that advocates the neutral role of the state by establishing certain rules, procedures and norms for the political life.
Secondly, Shahabuddin argues for a ‘rational’ demarcation between religion and politics. He notes ‘the Secular state must equally lay down the line of demarcation between religion and state….. Equally, for the separation of state and religion, we should begin by stopping religious penetrations’. (Ibid) This is again a very important point. Shahabuddin knows very well that religion symbolises an integrated worldview, a way of life and there are possibilities that this worldview might contradict with the legally defined boundaries of the modern state. To avoid this conflict, he suggests that the spheres of religion and the state should be well defined.
Thirdly, Shahabuddin asserts that the religious communities should be given freedom to define the essentials of their own religions. He argues ‘every religious community must be free to define the essentials of its faith and the secular state must respect these essentials and protect them from external interference. A secular state should not take the task of religious reforms even in the name of social reforms’ (Ibid). This is a complex issue. It is often argued that the secular state in India is also a ‘reformist state’ which aims at safeguarding the interest of the backward social classes simultaneously protecting the basic human rights of deprived ‘individuals’ within these social groups. During the debate on the Muslim Personal Laws in 1986, the secularists supported the Supreme Court verdict in the famous Shah Bano case on the ground that the state can intervene in the sphere of any religious community for wider social good. Shahabuddin not only rejects this argument but also indicates the emptiness of another legal concept: ‘essential practices’.
To understand Shahabuddin’s position on this issue, we need to look at the Article 26 of the Indian Constitution that reaffirms the commitment of the state for rights of religious minorities. This Article provides freedom to manage religious affairs such as establishing and maintaining institutions for religious and charitable purposes, acquiring property and managing religious institutions and so on. Since the term ‘religious affairs’ covers a variety of activities, it was technically important for the judiciary to consider which set of religious activity is more important than others. Thus, the Indian judiciary has devised an interesting concept of ‘essential practices’ of religion to determine the limitations of religious institutions and the secular control of the state. The Supreme Court in various cases has observed that there is an essential part of religion that constitutes the core or the centre of the entire belief system. The Ratilal versus State of Bombay (1954, SCR 1055) and the Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowment versus Lakshmindra (1954, SCR 1055) are important court cases in this regard. According to the Supreme Court, this ‘essential part of religion’ has to be protected and the state can intervene in other ‘non-essential religious activities’. The difference between the essential religious practices and the other non-essential religious practice may be understood as a workable legal formula. However, it raises an important question related to the nature of Indian secular judiciary. How could a secular judiciary based on rational principles determine the ‘essential practices’ and non-essential practices of a religion? Shahabuddin’s notion of secularism seems to suggest that this is prerogative of the religious communities to decide the essential practices of their faith.
Cover of Muslim India magazine
Let us now locate Shahabuddin’s position on religion and politics in the recent debate on the possibilities of ‘Indian secularism’. Broadly speaking, three kinds of responses to secularism can be identified. The first response denounces the very concept of western secularism and finds it inappropriate for the Indian situations.1 [note 1] Shahabuddin’s ideas do not seem to reject the internal logic of this thesis. He is very clear about the nature of the south Asian religions and the recent politicalization of religion by different rightist groups. He further identifies the fact that religion in India cannot be separated from politics. Yet, Shahabuddin gives importance to state’s neutral role. He looks at the structural foundation of the Indian state and argues that the democratic participation of all groups could ensure the neural role of the state institutions.
The second response to Indian secularism is a positive one. It defends the Indian version of secularism on moral, political and ethical grounds. In this regard, Shahabuddin’s understanding of secularism could be compared with social scientist Rajeev Bhargava’s well argued theory of ‘contextual Indian secularism’. Rajeev Bhargava analysing different classical arguments related to the separation between religion and politics, conceptualises two versions of classical secularism: (a) the ethical secularism that seeks the separation of religion from politics for the realization of some ultimate ideals (e.g. equality, rationality, egalitarianism etc.). (b) The political secularism that seeks the separation for making political arena much more workable. Unlike the ethical secularism, Bhargava argues, political secularism does not attempt to achieve any ultimate ideal. It is, in a sense, more practical form of secularism that tries to maintain a peaceful ordinary life by carving out separate boundaries for religion and politics. Examining the Indian situation Bhargava elaborates his conceptualisation of political secularism and suggests that in India a ‘contextual secularism’ was adopted to maintain a principled distance from religion (Bhargava, 1998). Bhargava appreciates the Indian secularism for its unique contextual features. In a broader sense, the theory of contextual Indian secularism simply endorses Shahabuddin’s theoretical premise. Shahabuddin and Bhargava approach secularism from two different vantage points, yet come out with similar conclusions. Shahabuddin approaches this concept from a practical political point of view; while Bhargava examines the recent debate on the viability of secularism in the Indian context.
The third response to secularism comes from the Hindutva groups. They argue that secularism should be based on equality and that the minorities should not be allowed to enjoy special privileges. Shahabuddin’s position rejects the ‘equality thesis’ of Hindutva on the ground that the Indian secularism is based on the conception of religious and social plurality. For him, ensuring plurality requires protection of minority rights.
Shahabuddin’s ideas on secularism point towards the specificity of Indian context. He advocates a specific kind of secularism for India which demarcates the spheres of politics and religions by respecting the specific nature of south Asian religious traditions. But, what is the relationship between secularism and social justice in his conceptualisation? This obvious question leads us to a theoretical fusion where Shahabuddin’s political ideas on social justice get linked to his position on secularism. And for that we need to look at the possibility and the relevance of ‘Muslim politics’ in the writings of Syed Shahabuddin.
IV
The Muslim Indians as a political community: secularism for social justice
We have seen so far that Shahabuddin has a broader view of Indian politics. However, his political engagements and his ideas related to Indian Muslim politics could be a vantage point to link the concepts like social justice, secularism and the necessity of political struggles in his writings.
In one of his editorials, Shahabuddin raises the question of ‘political community’. He asks: ‘Do Telugu, Tamil, Nagas, …Harijan Santhal and Mundas constitute political community?’ (Shahabuddin 1988, pp. 146-147). He notes, ‘If self perceptions as distinct group, assertion of identity or collective political action to conserve group interest or identity are elements of a ‘political community’, they all are, without implying separatism and a quest for autonomy’ (Ibid).
Shahabuddin further writes, ‘In a plural society, a political community is, therefore, one which is conscious of its identity whatever the basis-and its rights under the laws of the state of which it forms a part and which defines the parameters within which it operates to protect them. It acts politically when these rights and the basic human rights like right to life are threatened or infringed and when it is subjected to injustice and violence. In India every social group is and should be a political community’ (Ibid).
Thus, according to Shahabuddin there are three basic characteristics of a political community. Firstly, the consciousness of a collective self as a distinct identity makes a group of people ‘political’. It is the precondition of any collective thinking and/ or social action. This point indicates the mental universe of a community, its imaginations and its feelings of sameness. Secondly, the identification of common interest provides an agenda to this self-conscious group. The feeling of sameness leads to identify common history, common pride, common sufferings, common subjugation and common exploitations. This feeling, most importantly, help in formulating an agenda of social action. Thirdly, the framework of rights and the laws of the state also define the area of operation of its activities. This point indicates the strategy and the political way out this political community seeks to follow. Shahabuddin quite legitimately argues that these collective social struggles may take different forms but the legal boundaries would always be taken as a point of reference. The political communities may accept the existing legal framework and work to widen the scope of given legal rights or alternately may reject the Constitution and demand a complete re-organisation of the territorial system or social relation. However, in both cases, the legal framework would be a point of contestation.
Shahabuddin points out that the ‘Muslim community’ is a political community in India because all basic characteristics of a political community apply to Indian Muslim. He notes ‘Muslim Indians are no exception. It is a pan-Indian community which some times reacts uniformly to a given stimulus but it is by no means a monolithic or homogeneous community, linguistically, ethnically or culturally’(Ibid). He further notes that the religion provides a basic unity to Indian Muslim community; however, the ‘external push’ such as anti-Muslim violence gives it a momentum to speak a language of a political community. He writes ‘No doubt Muslim Indians see themselves, above all as a religious community, but they have to realise that they can protect their religious status or religious rights flowing from the constitution only through political action. Once they are conscious of this imperative, they become a political community’ (Ibid).
In this conceptualisation, Shahabuddin highlights two important sociological aspects of the Indian Muslim community. Firstly, he argues for a plural Indian Muslim community. He is well aware about the fact that there are different social and linguistic communities in India which follow Islam as a religion. In fact, the understanding of Islam of these communities is also not at all homogeneous and there are several Muslim sects and sub-sects in India.
Secondly, Shahabuddin forcefully argues for the common concerns of this plural Muslim community. In his opinion it does not mean that these Muslim communities do not recognise their Islamic identity. He notes, however, the ‘common concerns and priorities are more often overshadowed by local preoccupations and problems’ (Ibid). The question of being a political community and becoming a political community is contingent upon the ways by which Indian Muslims communities react to the ‘external pushes’ and internal self-perceptions. Thus, for Shahabuddin ‘being a religious community and becoming a political community, in larger and in national sense, are indeed, only two faces of the same coin-inseparable from each other’ (Ibid).
These two important aspects related to the political behaviour of Indian Muslims remind us the debate on Muslim identity in south Asia. There are three views about the Muslim identities in south Asia. Firstly there is an assimilation thesis that proposes that a synthesis has been worked in south Asia between the high Islamic ideals and custom centric traditions so that they co-exist as complementary and integral parts of a common religious system. This thesis sees the plurality of south Asian Islam and rejects any kind of ‘common agenda’ of Muslims.2 [note 2]
Historian Francis Robinson, however, takes a different position. For him, a tendency towards a perfect and pure Islam was always there among the Muslims of south Asia (Robinson, 1983). The political conduct of these communities in India is some where associated with the ideal kind of Islamic values. Farzana Shaikh extends this argument and attempts to trace out the notion of Islamic community during the late 19th and the early 20th century in India (Shaikh, 1989, p.9).
More recently, Richards Eaton has argued that historically there was a ‘double movement’ that had shaped the Islamic identity in South Asia. The ‘Indo-Islamic traditions that grew and flourished between 711 and 1750 served both to shape Islam to the regional cultures of south Asia and to connect Muslims of those cultures to a world wide faith community’ (Eaton, 2003, p.6). Richard Eaton’s argument is a synthesis of the first two positions. The interpretations of religious texts such as the Qur’an and Hadith, hierarchy of social order and economic and political power structures vary from one place to another but there is an intrinsic connection among different interpretations. This is precisely because of the synchronized existence of a double movement: the localization of Islamic principles and the Islamisation of the local cultures.
It is interesting to note that Shahabuddin’s position on this issue not only accommodates the intellectual contributions of these three views but also goes one step forward. Accepting the assimilation thesis Shahabuddin acknowledges the fact that the local cultural environments do influence the social identity of Muslims. Conversely, he also recognizes Robinson’s view that the power of Islam as an idea on Muslim communities cannot be ignored. And finally, his intelligent thesis that a religious community could act as a political community in particular context, gives a ‘political’ flavor to Richard Eaton’s well argued historical analysis.
This point can be connected to Shahabuddin’s controversial concept of ‘Muslim Indian’. In an interview, he elaborates this concept: “When I say Muslim India, it is a combination of an adjunctive and a noun; my substance (noun) is India, …..(Thus), one aspect of India which happens to be Muslim or Islamic. I say there is a Hindu India, there is a Muslim India …..there is a Brahmin India, there is a dalit India ….There are many Indias… inseparable in space, interpenetrating each other forming one great cohort” (Int. 30 March 2004, Delhi). This definition of ‘Muslim India’ stem from the premise that the idea of India is plural and every identity gives its own specific contribution to this plurality. Thus, the Muslim Indians have constitutionally and socially been recognised as a religious community in India; what need to be done in his opinion is that their collective existence and demands should be seen as part of democratic politics; not as anti-national separatism.
It is important to note that the collective existence of Muslim Indian is the central bases of his political thought. He asserts that the religion ought to be taken as a category for social analysis. It is again a complicated and sensitive issue and needs a further clarification. For Shahabuddin, recognising religion as a social category does not imply that the Muslim clergy of any kind should be given unrestricted powers to define the political actions of Muslims in India. Nor does it mean that the internal social issues of Muslims in India such as caste and Biradari hierarchies and the rights of Muslim women should be handed over to the ‘secular’ state. Let us take two examples to illuminate this point.
Firstly, in 1988, when the famous Muslim Madarsa of Deoband issued a fatwa against the Ayodhya March, proposed by the Babri Masjid Movement Coordination Committee (BMMCC), Shahabuddin writes ‘Republic of India is not Darul Harab, neither it is Darul Islam. But, it is Darul Aman and Darul Muhada. This is because the Muslim community enjoys freedom of religion and other fundamental rights and guarantees under the Constitution including the right to agitate democratically and peacefully if any constitutional and legal rights, individual or collective, are infringed’ .. .. The fatwa on Ayodhya march is in inappropriate as it is in Indian context, becomes thus a test of the holds of the religious establishment over the Muslim community. If the Muslim community treat such Fatwas with disdain, it can deal a fatal blow to the authority of the Ulema in the matters political. … It is for the Ulema with vision to avoid such a break, they must come forward, bridge the gap and join the political struggle for the defence of the constitutional rights’ (Shahabuddin, 1988a, pp. 339-340). This statement is the best example to illustrate the fact that the constitutional framework and the Islamic principles have to operate in different spheres of public life and should recognise the authority of each other.
The second example is a recent one, which shows a different side of Shahabuddin’s position on Muslim collective existence in India. Shahabuddin argues that in the case of Indian Muslims, the caste identity cannot be separated from religious identity. He emphasizes the fact that constitution has also accepted religion as a legitimate category for providing reservation as other backward classes and the caste difference among Muslims does not conceal the possibility of having religion-based reservation. He refutes the arguments given by the ideologues of the ‘Backward Muslims’ for the separate OBC quota for Muslim Backward castes on two grounds: (a) that the reservation for Muslim backwards is sociologically a valid demand but it should not be endorsed as a plea to reject the constitutionally accepted fact that the ‘Indian Muslims’ could be treated as a grand social category for the reservation in public employment. Alternately, Shahabuddin suggests that the Muslim OBCs should be given priority in the overall general reservation for Muslims as a backward class (Shahabuddin, MG, 1-15 October 2004, pp. 12-13). (b) At a time when unity among the Muslim community is needed more than ever before, such demands may break the unity of Muslims and Therefore it is important to focus on the collective interests and constitutional rights given to Muslims in India and at the same time create an awareness about social justice in a wider sense (Ibid).
Shahabuddin advocates a rational reservation system in India. He says ‘I would have no problem with a modified reservation system which break up the artificial conglomerates of SC’s, STc OBCs and minorities and introduce a regime of Universal Reservation with separate quotas for every identifiable and self conscious sub-group (religious, caste, racial, geographic, linguistic and cultural) in proportion to its population and its index of backwardness at every operational level. Even, in the event of a Muslim quota under the present system, if any Muslim sub-group which comprises more than 1% of the total population wishes to have its own sub-quota I have no objection though it may weaken the bargaining capacity of the community in other respect (original emphasis, Ibid).
The above two examples very clearly show that Shahabuddin’s idea of Muslim Indian is based on the ‘collective’ political response of the diverse Muslim communities in India which simply goes beyond the sociologically proved hierarchies of caste/biradaris and the theologically established norms of religious system. Shahabuddin talks about the sudden, common response of the Muslims in India on different issues that make them a community. Once this commonsensical logic of Muslim community-ness is identified as a potential political category, Shahabuddin seems to suggest, the politics of secularism becomes the politics of social justice. As he further notes, ‘In a multi-religious society … conflict situations lead to religious polarization. Essentially unfair distribution of scare resources leads to communal discord. Hence the state must devise distribution patterns and selection systems in which the religion of a person or a group plays little or no part’ (Shahabuddin 1987, pp. 435-436).
V
In Lieu of a Conclusion: How to (and How Not to) Criticize Shahabuddin
In this final section of the paper we now move on to the problematic aspects of Shahabuddin’s understanding of Indian political system. This is a very crucial task because unfortunately Shahabuddin has always been criticised for wrong reasons by the Hindutva and the secularists alike: partly because of the sheer ignorance and/or deliberate rejection of his political thinking and partly because of his own polemical style of politics. Our discussion so far has suggested that it is possible to refuse and reject the political thinking of Syed Shahabuddin but for that one really needs be fair and objective and avoid the given ready-made ‘communal versus secular framework’. In fact, the purpose of criticism should be to evaluate the strength of any kind of thinking rather forming opinion on the basis of ‘fashionable’ categories and approaches that are widely circulated in the academic market of ideas.
There could be several kinds of criticism to Shahabuddin’s understanding of Indian political system in general and the politics of social justice in particular. However, we do not have his ‘collected works’ to make wider criticisms on his political theorization. His writings, as we just saw, could be understood as a kind of ‘commentary’ on contemporary political issues. Thus, it should be made clear that the following criticisms of Shahabuddin stem from our own analysis and can only be applied to those writings of Shahabuddin, which have been examined in this paper. Let us try to make use of his ‘representative writings’ again for tracing out the three most critical aspects of his thinking.
Firstly, Shahabuddin’s approach to politics and social life is dominated by a kind of legal constitutionalism. His adherence to the basic values of Indian Constitutional system can be appreciated on the ground that the Constitution some how represents the aspirations of the freedom movement and therefore it has a ‘people-oriented’ character. But, we cannot ignore the role of actual politics that provides altogether new meanings to the Constitution itself. After all, the Constitution was a product of politics; a symmetry of certain political ideas and forces that came to an agreement at a historical juncture. In any case, politics follows its own course and trajectories; it does not require any constitution to abide by. Shahabuddin’s analysis of Indian Constitution does not give adequate importance to the actual politics that certainly goes beyond the given legal constitutional framework. Political demands stem from wider ideological universe and not necessarily follow the given notions of justice and equality. The separatist movements in India can be the best example of this. Shahabuddin’s political framework cannot explain the raison d’être of those movements, which do not recognise Indian Constitution.
Secondly, there is another problem with this sort of legal Constitutionalism. In this structure, the politics of social justice is supposed to operate within the ‘state system’, which encompasses every form of political participation. There is no space for any kind of external forces that could not only affect the structure of the state system but also re-define the arena of the politics of mass participation. For instance, the globalisation has been an external force that is actually re-shaping the basic structure of the Indian state quite significantly. The welfare state model of development, which was adopted by the postcolonial policy makers as an instrument for achieving overall socio-economic progress of the country, has been replaced by a more ‘laissez-faire’ model. This new state has already rolled back from the social sector and the responsibility of social regeneration is being given to the civil society organizations. The question of reservation in public employment and education for achieving social justice through state system has lost its relative significance as a viable political agenda today. The increasing role of the private sector dominated by the global multinationals is realty in India. This changed state of affairs is also important because the globalization has also brought the possibility of the internationalization of mass politics of social justice. We do not find any detailed explanation of this rapidly changing political scenario in the writing of Shahabuddin. It is true he is sensitive about these changes but his faithfulness to the old state structure is quite problematic.
Thirdly and perhaps most importantly Shahabuddin’s position on the collective existence of Muslim community in India as a political community can also be criticized. It is true that despite several kinds of differences, there is a ‘Muslim community’ in India, which no doubt responds and behaves quite ‘politically’ at certain points of time, but it is also true that there are virtually no forums where the internal contradictions of this single Muslim community could be discussed or reconciled. From Shahabuddin’s perspective one could point towards the community institutions such as the All India Muslim Personal Law Board or the Muslim Mujlis-e-Mushawarat as possible responsive and ‘democratic’ institutions. But the scope of these institutions is very limited and does not accommodate the multiple identities and issues of Muslim masses.
The political credibility of any kind of systematic thinking depends on the ways by which the world of politics is approached and its relationships with the structures of society are understood. In case of Shahabuddin, we find that he talks about the basic structure of Indian democracy and is still committed to the ideal of Indian constitutionalism. He places the issues of Indian Muslims in the wider political realities of postcolonial India. What makes him different is that he does not subscribe to the ‘given’ ideal image of Indian system. For him democratic participation, being the basic principle of Indian political system, is a key to achieve social justice.
Let us now come back to the question of categories and parameters. Shahabuddin’s political thinking makes it very clear that the fixed images of ‘Muslims’ in contemporary India do not allows us to look at those creative articulations, which do not fit into the given popular categories. Thus, acknowledging Shahabuddin’s claims of collective plurality, we argue that the interaction between India’s Muslims and different forms of ‘modern’ liberal representative institutions have produced a ‘modern’ Indo-Islamic philosophical tradition, which does not envisage any fundamental contradiction between Islam and democracy.
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Dr. Hilal Ahmed is Associate Fellow at Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS). He can be reached at [email protected].
Link:
http://muslimindiamonthly.com/
Notes:
1. Very broadly the works T.N. Madan and Ashis Nandy could be cited as examples of this position on secularism. T.N. Madan argues that the South Asian religions are totalising in the sense that the religious life cannot be separated from the public life and therefore western concept of secular is impotent to fight with the growing religious fundamentalism. Madan proposes that the secularism should not be overemphasised to reject the religious worldviews (Madan 1998). Ashis Nandy makes a difference between the religion as a faith and religion as an ideology (Nandy 1998). The latter is a perverted and politicised form of religion. Nandy argues that the secularism as a western modern idea has been used by the middle classes in India not only to reject the cultural claims of the people but also to politicise religion.
2. Imtiaz Ahmad’s thesis of assimilation is the theoretical foundation of four volumes of essays by various authors edited by him on different social aspects of Muslim communities of south Asia. T.N. Madan’s work on Kashmiri Muslim identity also identifies the existence of ‘dual social orders which are accommodated within one overarching framework’ (Madan, 1972). Paul Brass and Mushirul-Hasan develop this assimilation thesis in two different directions. Brass’s earlier work emphasizes upon the appropriation of popular symbols by the Muslim elite (Brass, 1979, pp.35-77). His later work on ethnic violence identifies some socially institutionalized communal networks that promote different forms of collective violence in India (Brass, 2002). Mushirul-Hasan regards the ‘follower of Islam not as a religious collectivity, homogenous and structured, but as a disparate, differentiated and stratified segment of society’ (Hasan, 1997, p. 21).
References:
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Ahmad, Imtiaz, (1976), (Ed.) Family, Kinship and Marriages among Muslim in India, Manohar, Delhi
Ahmad, Imtiaz, (1981), (Ed.) Ritual and Religion among Muslim in India, Manohar, Delhi
Bhargava, Rajeev, (1998), “ What is Secularism For”, in Bhargava, Rajeev, (Ed.), Secularism and Its Critics, Oxford University Press, Delhi.
Brass, Paul, (1974), Language, Religion and Politics in North India, Cambridge University Press, London
Eaton, Richard M., (2003), “Introduction” in Eaton, Richards M. (Ed.) India’s Islamic Traditions: 711- 1750, Oxford University Press, New Delhi
Hasan, Mushirul, (1997), Legacy of a Divided Nation: India’s Muslims Since Independent, Hurst publisher London
Int. 30 March 2004, a tape-recorded interview with Syed Shahabuddin
Madan, T.N. (1995), “Introduction”, in Madan, T.N. (Ed.) Muslim Community in South Asia, Manohar, Delhi, (revised edition).
Madan, T.N., (1998), “Secularism in Its Place”, in Bhargava, Rajeev, (Ed.), Secularism and Its Critics, Oxford University Press, Delhi.
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