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Indonesia to use its dormant Islamic voice

By Dewi Fortuna Anwar, NNN-News Straits Times

Jakarta : President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in his first major speech on foreign policy in 2005, proclaimed that Indonesia would project its image internationally as the world’s largest Muslim nation, the third largest democracy and a modern society.
In short, Indonesia is projected as a country where Islam, democracy and modernity go hand in hand. The official proclamation of Islam as being part of Indonesia’s national identity by Susilo is something quite new in Indonesia’s modern history.

Despite the fact that nearly 90 per cent of Indonesians are Muslims, Indonesia is neither an Islamic state nor is Islam the official religion of the state. Historically, Islam’s place and role in Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine, articulation or implementation has been negligible.

Indonesia’s “Independent and Active” Foreign Policy Doctrine, first enunciated in 1948, has been formed more by a strong sense of nationalism, characterised by vehement anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.

Indonesia was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and its relations with other Muslim countries has mostly emphasised their common experience as former colonies and position as developing countries. Until recently, there has not been any specific “Islamic” thrust in Indonesia’s foreign policy.
Throughout most of Suharto’s New Order period (1966-1998), political Islam was proscribed in Indonesia’s domestic politics and consequently the government would not allow political expressions of Indonesia’s Islamic identity at home or abroad.

Political Islam was seen as a threat to Indonesia’s national unity and political stability, since in the past it had struggled to replace the pluralist state ideology, Pancasila, or to insert the stipulation that all Muslims must adhere to the Syariah in the Constitution, which would give Islam a special status vis-a-vis other religions practised in the country.

In Pancasila, the Indonesian state dictates belief in One God, but specifies no particular religion, thus enjoining the state to promote and protect different religious beliefs equally.

Suharto feared radical Islamic influence from the Middle East, so that contacts with Middle Eastern countries were limited. Indonesia became a member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), but tended to take a back seat in the organisation.

Among the few “Islamic” expressions in Indonesia’s foreign policy were Jakarta’s consistent support for the Palestinian struggle to establish an independent state and refusal to recognise Israel.

In fact, while the Indonesian public’s strong solidarity for the Palestinians is mostly based on religious sentiment, the Indonesian government has primarily seen the issue from the perspective of self-determination of an occupied territory.

The Muslim voice in Indonesia’s foreign policy until recently was mostly related to public opposition to any efforts by the government to develop relations with Israel before the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved.

Given this historical background, Susilo’s recent attempt to project Indonesia’s Islamic identity onto the world stage is worthy of note. The mainstreaming of Islam in Indonesian public discourse is both a reflection of internal political developments and a response to the current international climate.

Domestically, after decades of conflicts and tensions between Islam and the state, a national consensus has emerged that Indonesia’s pluralist identity must not be tampered with, ensuring that Pancasila would remain the state ideology and that Islam cannot be formally incorporated into the state system, while at the same time opening the political space for Islamic parties to participate in public lives.

Internationally, the US-led war on terror has engendered perceived conflicts between the West and the Muslim world, in which the latter is popularly portrayed in the West as anti-democratic, anti-modernity and anti-West.

Indonesia is projected as a bridge between the Muslim World and the West, as well as providing an alternative model for Muslim societies to live.

Looking at the four current main objectives of Indonesia’s foreign policy, namely economic recovery and growth, national unity and territorial integrity, democratic consolidation, and finally promoting regional and global peace with appropriate roles for Indonesia, the Islamic theme only plays out in the fourth area.

Muslim countries have played relatively minor roles in Indonesia’s economy compared to Japan, the United States and western European countries, while concerns for its territorial integrity have focused Indonesia’s attention on maintaining high-level interaction with its close regional neighbours in Asean and the South-West Pacific.

For its democratic consolidation, Indonesia has primarily looked to established democracies for inspiration and assistance, while arguing against the views in some Muslim societies that Islam and democracy are not compatible. It is only in the fourth area, of promoting regional and global peace, that Indonesia has attempted to make use of its Islamic credentials.

Quite early in his presidency, Susilo tried to restore Indonesia’s international image and reactivate Indonesia’s foreign policy, which had suffered major setbacks following the economic crisis and the political upheaval after the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime.

Besides reasserting itself in Asean, Jakarta has also tried to play some mediating roles in the Korean peninsula and in the Middle East, albeit in very modest ways.

For instance, soon after the Hamas victory, the Palestinian Authority enlisted Indonesia’s help in lobbying western governments not to cut off funding. Indonesia was one of the first countries to send peacekeeping troops to Lebanon in the wake of the recent violence.

Indonesia has also played an active role in promoting inter-faith dialogues, as well as dialogues within Islam. Early this year, Indonesia hosted a dialogue between Muslim religious leaders of both the Sunni and Shia sects from the Middle East.

While Indonesia strongly opposed the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, Susilo made some suggestions to help foster peace in Iraq — including national reconciliation and the withdrawal of American and other Western forces, followed by the deployment of peace-keeping troops from Muslim countries, including Indonesia, until political normalcy is achieved.

Indonesia’s attempts to project its Islamic credentials and use the “Islamic” card in its foreign policy initiatives, however, are tempered by several major constraints.

On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Indonesia’s lack of diplomatic relations with Israel limits the role that Jakarta can play, especially as there is still strong public opposition at home to the government even talking to Israel.

Indonesia’s limited capacity in terms of financial resources and technical capability also prevents the country from taking a more substantive role in helping to resolve international conflicts where concrete actions are needed.

Another stumbling block in Indonesia’s efforts to be seen as a serious power broker in the Muslim World, is that Indonesia does not yet have the necessary Islamic credibility among the more conservative Muslim countries. In the past, Indonesia had been at the periphery of Islamic civilisation, so it will be a challenge for Indonesia to get into the Islamic mainstream.

Efforts are now being made to render Indonesia’s Islamic voices less marginal in Islamic discourses worldwide.

Indonesia wants to challenge the erstwhile perception that Islam is synonymous with the Middle East. After all, there are more Muslims living in Indonesia than in the whole of the Arab world.

Parts of Indonesia’s public diplomacy initiatives are to translate the writings of Indonesian Muslim scholars into English and Arabic so that they can be accessible to readers outside of Indonesia.

Indonesia hopes that greater knowledge about the predominantly Muslim nation, which has officially promoted religious tolerance and gender equality from the very beginning, and where Islamic civil society organisations have been at the forefront of democratic activism and social development, would help to present an alternative image to the current prevailing image about Islam and Muslims in general.

The benefits to Indonesia’s own international image would, of course, be a bonus.
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Professor Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar is the deputy chairman for Social Science and Humanities at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lipi) in Jakarta.