By Byron Bland
Several years ago, a high-level Israeli official asked me to tell him everything I could about how the Israelis might find their Palestinian Nelson Mandela. His question was interesting and appropriate, but also troubling; the Afrikaners didn’t really “find” Mandela. It took several months before the answer came to me: Show me the Palestinian to whom you Israelis are willing to lose, and I will to show you your Palestinian Mandela.
My friend had overlooked the fact that Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) had won in South Africa. The defining element in this so-called miracle was that white South Africans had, in one way or another and to varying degrees, accepted this outcome-making it, if not their victory, then certainly something other than their defeat.
There were many factors that drove the process toward success, but no one would deny that leadership-Mandela’s leadership-played a decisive role. Although he was offered his freedom numerous times if he would just give up the struggle against apartheid, it was a deal that only a quisling would make. Mandela was made of sterner stuff and refused to make the fundamental concession the Afrikaners sought.
South African President Frederik W. de Klerk’s decision to release Mandela unconditionally came in response to the unrest that had rendered the country ungovernable. De Klerk hoped to engage Mandela in a lengthy negotiation in which he could be coaxed into making critical compromises. Nevertheless, after many ups and downs, it was de Klerk, not Mandela, who made the fundamental compromises.
How did this unbelievable turn of events come about? The standard political science answer is that de Klerk found himself on a slippery slope where he thought that every concession was the last needed to get Mandela to comply. Still, this account cannot explain why, in the end, de Klerk conceded power to the ANC, especially when the South African state was not on the verge of collapse.
It is always difficult to look into the mind of a political leader at a crucial moment. Nevertheless, I think a fundamental shift took place in the way de Klerk saw Mandela. De Klerk came to power thinking that Mandela was the only African who could make the concessions needed to keep Afrikaner South Africa afloat. Slowly, he came to see Mandela, instead, as the African who could give Afrikaners a future they could live with.
Mandela let no opportunity pass to talk about the place of white South Africans in the new South Africa. He emphasized time and again that majority rule did not mean the domination of the white minority by a black majority. Seeking a “middle ground between white fears and black hopes,” Mandela laid the very foundation for peace: “We do not want to drive you into the sea.” Mandela believed there would be no peace unless white South Africans heard and believed his words.
In virtually every statement, Mandela presented a vision of the future in which white South Africans would be appreciated and respected. Those who heard him felt that they, their family, and their community could have a satisfying and secure life in what he was describing. Rather than offering concessions that would prop up the old, Mandela was offering a new future to many who had begun to doubt that they had one.
Israelis need to find a Palestinian Mandela, and Palestinians need to find an Israeli Mandela. However, the Mandela they need to find is not a leader who will make the concessions they seek, but one to whom they can make the concessions they say they cannot offer. Mandela was this kind of leader-his repeated actions and unequivocal words gave witness to a future that Afrikaners could embrace without fear.
Mandela presents today’s leaders with a twin challenge. First, how do we find person on the other side to whom we can make the concessions we feel we cannot afford to make? Second, and much more important, how can we become people to whom the other side can make the concessions they say they cannot make? Both are important, but the second is critical in a time when each, standing back, looks to the other to perform the difficult actions needed to move the peace process forward.
Progress toward peace between the Israelis and Palestinians is not stalled because no one can envision the final settlement. Every thoughtful observer knows that some rough approximation of the Clinton administration formula is the only deal possible. The question is not so much what is needed, for this much is known. The real question is: who will lead us there?
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Byron Bland is associate director of the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation and a research associate at the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.
Source: Daily Star, 04 September 2007, www.dailystar.com.lb
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