By Dr Mookhi Amir Ali,
The reshuffle of the cabinet on 12th of July 2011 highlights the uncertainty of the stability of a coalition government. A prime minister had no say in the allocation of a very important portfolio. Two important ministries have been given as additional responsibility to two other important ministers, thereby making four portfolios without full-fledged ministers manning them. The coalition government cannot function with any efficiency if it has to be constantly concerned about its own survival. The prime minister who is answerable to the nation on all matters of governance and on behalf of all ministers has a ready alibi, “coalition compulsion”. Since coalition governments are unavoidable in our multi-party democracy an antidote to this noxious state of affairs is necessary. There should be a solemn agreement among all political parties forming a coalition government which may have the following clauses.
One. The leader of the largest party places on the president’s table a written pledge of all the supporting parties while staking a claim to form the government. More often than not, the President has asked the leader of the largest party to first form the government and then show the majority on the floor of the house. There is history of one central government falling before even facing the house while yet another had a life of thirteen days. Such situations have to be avoided.
Two. The Common Minimum Programme of the coalition, the basic frame-work of the cabinet formation, the proportional representation of the partners and all such contentious issues should be thrashed out before the smaller parties pledge their support.
Three. At this very stage the largest party wanting to form the government with the hep of other parties will deem to have “paid the price” of the support. The supporting parties will deem to have received their full “pound of flesh”. The support pledged to the government at this time should be considered the support pledged for the entire term. All parties should solemnly agree to remain with the government, whatever may be the difference.
Four. The subsistence of a government in the office should not depend on its success or failure to get a bill passed. Except in special cases like finance bill, the defeat of a bill need not mean the fall of the government. If Man Mohan Singh’s government’s fate had not hinged on passing the Indo-US nuclear deal, perhaps, he would not have wanted to push it through by means bordering on skulduggery. Also one or more alliance partners should be in a position to kill a bill without killing the government. If the very fate of the central government – and by implication the fate of the parliament- had not hinged on this nuclear bill, it is possible that the Indo-US nuclear bill would not have passed. Some parties may have voted for the bill just so that the parliament subsists.
Five. The cabinet formation and the allocation of portfolios should be entirely the prerogative of the Prime minister. He need only abide by the quantum of representation of supporting parties or at the most the portfolios agreed upon prior to their pledge of support.
This way the coalition government formed at the beginning of the term will survive its entire term. No coalition partner would blackmail the government into submission to their will. Once all the parties know that they have no sword to dangle on the government’s head they would be focussed on their accountability to their own constituencies. The prime minister will not have an alibi of “coalition compulsion”, which has been heard all too often lately.