By IANS,
New Delhi: Human failure, lack of observance of safety guidelines, defunct devices and faulty safety audits seemed to be some of the reasons for the fire at the Indian Oil Corp terminal in Jaipur in October last year, an independent inquiry committee has found out.
“The basic or root cause is an absence of site specific, written operating procedures, absence of leak stopping devices from a remote location, and insufficient understanding of hazards, risks and consequences,” M.B. Lal, who chaired the independent inquiry committee, told reporters here Tuesday
The seven-member committee submitted its report to Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Murli Deora Monday.
The blaze that started Oct 29 raged on for 11 days killed 11 people. The total losses suffered by Indian Oil amounted to nearly Rs.280 crore (Rs. 2.8 billion). The total loss of petroleum products was about 60,000 kilolitres.
The incident started in the evening shift Oct 29, when a crew of four personnel of Indian Oil were doing a routine procedure of transfer of kerosene and motor spirit to a pipeline to the neighboring installation of Bharat Petroleum Corp Limited.
At about 5.30 p.m., there were only three people on duty, as one of the employees had gone out for some personal work.
Only one employee was operating the valve of tank 401A, known as Hammer blind valve, a device which is used to isolate a pipeline. It was found that liquid motor spirit had gushed out from the open area on the top of the valve, as another valve connecting to the tank was also open at the same time.
One after another, the three personnel went to the spot and fell unconscious due to the overpowering fumes.
“Non-availability of a self-contained breathing apparatus and fire suit immediately left the entire response team as mere helpless spectators in preventing the incident,” said Lal.
Since none of the shift staff were available and the senior management could not reach the site, the leak continued for 75 minutes, before it led to a big explosion.
It was estimated that the nearly 1000 tonnes of motor spirit had leaked out, which led to an explosion equivalent to 20 tonnes of TNT. Window panes of buildings over two km away shattered due to the massive blast.
The dyke wall surrounding the tank was found to have an open outlet, thereby failing to contain the leak.
The Oil Industry Safety Directorate found that the remote leak stopping device was not working at the Jaipur terminal in an audit in 2003. But the inquiry found that despite the recommendation of the 2003 audit, the remote leak stopping device was never operational in the last six years.
“Even after the leak started, the accident could have been managed if safety measures provided in the control room were taken,” said Lal, adding that the lack of shutdown from the control room, absence of senior officers and any emergency response for 75 minutes led to the uncontrolled explosion.
Among the major recommendations was the strengthening of the safety function in Indian Oil Corporation by improving the quality of the cadre and making it directly report to the head. It also asked for strengthening the internal safety auditing functions by making it cross-functional and providing professional safety auditing training.