By IANS,
New Delhi : Excerpts from the exchange of documents on the India-US nuclear deal by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the Left, as released by the Left parties:
Left (Sep 14, 2007): We can import reactors and uranium fuels so that we become dependent, but cannot access technology from the international market which will truly foster self-reliance. Not only would large parts of the existing technology sanctions stay, we are also proposing to put ourselves in a double bind. We will open our new reprocessing facility and the future breeder programme to IAEA inspections, without securing any relaxation of the technology sanctions regime for these facilities and plants. Has the government done any exercise to analyse the implications of this?
UPA (Sep 17, 2007): India has no intention to place fast breeder reactors under safeguards. The new reprocessing facility is not linked to India’s breeder programme. The new facility is to reprocess foreign supplied spent fuel under safeguards and its products will be used in safeguarded reactors.
Left (Sep 19,2007): The UPA’s note has not responded to the specific query made in the Left note as to whether the implications of building a new reprocessing plant under the present technology sanctions, and then putting it under IAEA Safeguards and Additional Protocols, have been examined.
UPA (Sep 24,2007): Where future reactors are concerned, the government retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian, obviously taking all factors into account. As conveyed in the earlier UPA note, we have no intention of placing current fast breeder reactors under safeguards. We will consider offering specific fast breeder reactors for safeguards only after technology has stabilised and we are ready to use plutonium recovered from spent fuel of foreign origin.
Left (Oct 5, 2007): A programme based on imported reactors and fuels doesn’t seem to take into account that the nuclear suppliers’ cartel, though technically of 45 countries, is in effect a very narrow one. Therefore, dependence on imported fuel would be a deviation from the original three-phased path of nuclear energy development, and would be detrimental for future energy security.
UPA (Oct 8,2007): (The) government will consider offering specific fast breeder reactors for safeguards only after technology has stabilised and we are ready to use plutonium recovered from spent fuel of foreign origin.
Left (Oct 20, 2007): There are a number of questions with regard to economics of nuclear energy that need to be answered.
Left (Oct 2, 2007): Growing military collaboration with the US would harm India’s security interests.
UPA (Oct 5, 2007): Our international friends and partners recognise our commitment to pursue an independent foreign policy. If India could exercise autonomy in its decision making during the Cold War period, there is no reason to believe that today, when our strength as a global power is recognised, we can be coerced into following a foreign policy dictated by another country.
Left (Oct 22, 2007): It is clear that the Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement poses the real danger of locking India into a “strategic partnership” with the US. By the very nature of the relationship, India can only end up as a subordinate ally in the US geo-strategy, aiding and abetting its military misadventures.
UPA (Nov 16, 2007): In an international situation marked by simultaneous competition and cooperation among the major powers, and of unprecedented interdependence created by globalisation, representing both a threat and an opportunity for developing countries, the government has steadily improved India’s relations with all major powers.